




Medicine Anthropology Theory 3, no. 2: 149–162; http://doi.org/10.17157/mat.3.2.430 







Ecologies of evidence in a 
mysterious epidemic 
Charles L. Briggs 
Abstract 
An epidemic in a Venezuelan rainforest in 2007–2008 killed thirty-eight children and young 
adults, puzzling clinicians, epidemiologists, and healers alike for over a year. This essay traces 
the way each contribution to knowledge production formed part of a larger ‘ecology of 
evidence’. Focusing on how the parents’ knowledge was exploited and denigrated by 
clinicians, epidemiologists, and healers alike points to the ‘health/communicative inequities’ 
– grossly unequal distributions of access to the production and circulation of evidence – that 
structured ecologies of evidence in ways that thwarted diagnosis. Recruiting a nurse, a healer, 
a physician, and an anthropologist, two indigenous leaders launched an investigation that 
juxtaposed parents' narratives, vernacular healing, epidemiology, and clinical medicine, 
resulting in a clinical diagnosis of bat-transmitted rabies. This case suggests that perspectives 
in global health will fail to become fully critical unless they attend to health/communicative 
inequities, how they structure ecologies of evidence, and strategies for transforming them. 
Resumen 
En una zona selvática de Venezuela en 2007–2008, treinta y ocho niños, niñas, y jóvenes 
fallecieron en una epidemia. Utilizando el concepto de ‘ecologías de evidencia’, este ensayo 
analiza como médicos, epidemiólogos y curadores todos, explotaron y al mismo tiempo 
menospreciaron el conocimiento de los padres y las madres de los fallecidos, creando 
‘inequidades comunicativas en salud’ que dificultaron el proceso diagnóstico por más de un 
año. Conjuntamente con una enfermera, un sanador, una médica y un antropólogo, dos 







líderes indígenas iniciaron una investigación que daba importancia a las narrativas de los 
padres y las madres, la medicina indígena, la epidemiología y la medicina clínica, resultando 
en un diagnóstico presuntivo de rabia transmitida por murciélagos. Este caso indica que las 
perspectivas en salud global no pueden llegar a ser realmente críticas sin analizar como las 
inequidades comunicativas en salud estructuran las ecologías de evidencia, y sin explorar 
posibilidades para transformarlas. 
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Figure 1. Holding her son Romeliano, Anita Rivas watches her husband, Arsenio Torres, sing a 
lament over the body of their daughter, Elbia Torres Rivas; Barranquita, Venezuela, 2008. 
Photograph by Charles L. Briggs. 







Medical anthropologists have studied the production of evidence in clinical trials, public 
health programs, genetics, brain scans, and much more. Particular attention has been 
directed to the fetishization of statistical measures, images, and means of converting genetic 
samples into information as privileged sources of evidence. An ethnographic perspective 
might push us to investigate what I call ‘ecologies of evidence’, broader assemblages of 
interlocking ways of producing specific types of evidence and rendering them mobile, 
demoting other forms to the status of ignorance, superstition, or pathology, and simply 
rendering others unthinkable. I suggest here that attention to how authoritative forms of 
evidence both depend on and distance themselves from these broader ecologies points to 
the fundamental role of what I call ‘health/communicative inequities’: grossly unequal 
distributions of access to the production and circulation of evidence.1  
Epidemics are particularly useful sites to explore in tracing ecologies of evidence. Public 
health officials, politicians, journalists, and others jointly transform theories of disease 
causation into linear narrative and dramaturgical forms that condense epidemiological, social, 
and political complexities into moral frameworks, bringing together ‘ideology, social 
structure, and the construction of particular selves’ (Rosenberg 1992, 279). Epidemics in 
which the production of evidence resists transformation into a diagnosis are particularly 
interesting for exploring ecologies of evidence ethnographically, given battles over what 
constitutes evidence and who possesses it in the face of pervasive uncertainty (see Anderson 
2008; Lindenbaum 2001). Rather than reading mysterious epidemics as germ thrillers, we can 
use them to think conceptually about everyday ecologies of evidence. This essay explores an 
ecology of evidence that emerged during an epidemic in the Delta Amacuro rainforest of 
eastern Venezuela, detailing how health/communicative inequities thwarted diagnosis for 
more than a year. It argues for the importance of critical perspectives on 
health/communicative inequities in achieving critical public health. 
 
They didn’t tell us. I have no idea. . . .  
They just gave us the boy and we came back here. 
– Graciano Florín 
 
Mukoboina could have won an award for being the most nondescript among hundreds of 
small settlements in the Delta Amacuro rainforest of eastern Venezuela. Mukoboina boasted 
 
1  I use the term ‘inequities’ rather than ‘inequalities’, following Breilh (2003), in order to target not 
simply observed patterns but the factors that produce them. 







some eighty residents and a dozen thatch-roofed houses perched on stilts above the mud 












Figure 2. Wilmer Torres tells the story of losing two of his children to the strange disease; 
Mukoboina, Venezuela, 2008. Photograph by Charles L. Briggs. 
 
And then Mukoboina’s children started to die, mysteriously. ‘Gabriel suddenly developed a 
fever in July 2007’, father Wilmer Torres recalled.2 When the fever persisted and the eight-
year-old child grew weaker, Wilmer and wife Zoila Torres took their son to the local wisidatu 
healer, Inocencio Torres. But ‘it was impossible, impossible. He treated and treated him, but 
. . . nothing happened. Then heavy saliva appeared’. Strangely intense and persistent 
symptoms followed, disconcerting bodily states that challenged familiar diagnostic 
 
2  Parents asked us to use their names and those of their children: ‘We want lots of people to know!’ 
Names of government officials and physicians are pseudonyms.  







categories. Gabriel died before reaching the clinic, some twenty minutes away by motorboat 
or hours paddling a canoe. Then on 8 August, ‘just the same way, his little sister developed 
an identical fever. It was the same sickness’. They took two-year-old Yuri to see Uncle 
Inocencio, who again worked much of the night, but the results were no different. The next 
day, the parents visited nurse José Pérez, telling him, ‘We took her last night to the wisidatu, 
but she was just the same in the morning’. The nurse placed her in a hammock to treat her, 
but his medicines failed too. Next they headed for the clinic at Nabasanuka. During the trip, 
‘Yuri just kept getting sicker’. She cried out continually and she couldn’t even walk by the 
time they arrived. Yuri was the first case of the strange disease to reach the clinic, where 
experienced bilingual nurses worked alongside a newly graduated physician.  
By September five more Mukoboinan children had died, followed by one in January 2008, 
part of a second wave of cases. Odilia Torres and Romer Torres lost all three children, 
leaving only an infant born during the epidemic. Each illness sparked a frantic search to find 
someone who could provide a diagnosis and point the way to treatment; hiring a boat and 
buying gasoline and oil placed families deeply in debt. They visited scores of healers of 
different specialties, nurses, the local physician, the hospital in the state capital, and the 
intensive care units of metropolitan hospitals, only to bring their children home in coffins, 
terrified that they would find that even as they sang ritual laments and began funeral 
preparations, another child would suddenly display ‘the same fever’. June 2008 ushered in a 
third wave over a wider area – sixteen deaths in two months, including six young adults. In 
total, thirty-eight died. 
 
The parents were very nervous because they could see  
that this child was going to die just like their daughter. . . .  
I had never seen any disease like that. 
– Dr. Ricardo Cáceres 
 
The local physician, Dr. Ricardo Cáceres, recalled that the first patient with the strange 
symptoms ‘had a temperature of 41 degrees [Celsius], an intense headache, and great 
difficulty breathing. I administered rehydration solution and an antipyretic to control the 
fever’. A stethoscope revealed ‘severe hoarseness and a crackling sound, so I also nebulized 
him’, that is, administered an inhaler. Cáceres paused, took a deep breath, and then related 
that three more Mukoboina children, between six and eight years of age, soon arrived with 
the same symptoms; he referred them immediately to the hospital in the state capital, 
Tucupita. The Regional Health Service (RHS) had never repaired the fluvial ambulance used 







to take patients upriver, so Cáceres had to work with the local health committee and Claretin 
missionaries to find boats, drivers, gasoline, and oil.  
When Cáceres could not diagnose the disease, his treatments did not help, and children were 
returning from urban hospitals in coffins, the parents and their neighbors wanted answers; 
the tone in which they questioned Cáceres grew increasingly worried, then insistent, then 
angry. But neither health officials nor urban specialists provided Cáceres with answers. 
Romer Torres ended his narrative describing the death of their third child from the disease 
with a chilling description: ‘And when we arrived here and opened the casket, it looked as if 
they had split [their daughter Yomelis’s] head open from front to back, and she was cut from 
her neck down’. He slid his finger down to his navel. Autopsies were performed on children 
without consent, explanation, or warning.  
When parents opened the coffins provided by government officials after their children died 
in urban hospitals, they found that their children had been turned into evidence. Angry, they 
demanded to know why their children had been ‘mistreated’. Cáceres defended RHS, 
reassuring parents that autopsies were performed in order to yield the evidence needed for 
diagnosis. Cáceres repeatedly requested but never received the results. Time passed. The 
answers never came. Trust in him and his medicine suffered, and many parents refused even 
to take infants with respiratory or diarrheal diseases to the clinic, fearing that they would end 
up in coffins. 
 
You see, we did all of this [investigation], but there was no mercury.  
It wasn’t lead or anything like that.  
– Dr. Yolanda Othegui 
 
Epidemiologists came to Mukoboina again and again after Adalia Florín died in the intensive 
care unit of the Dr. Manuel Núñez Tovar Hospital in Maturín, the nearest metropolitan 
hospital; a toxicologist and pediatrician suspected mercury poisoning. The regional 
epidemiologist soon left the state capital for Mukoboina, accompanied by an epidemiologist 
assigned to the local area, a sanitary engineer, a bioanalyst, a laboratory assistant, and a 
motorboat operator. Shortly afterwards, the state’s food sanitation coordinator, a public 
health inspector, and an employee of the Ministry of the Environment came. Then a Cuban 
epidemiologist associated with Mission Barrio Adentro, a program launched by the Cuban 







and Venezuelan governments,3 brought two other Cuban doctors, the local physician, a 
dentist, boat operators, translators, schoolteachers, and community leaders. 
Physicians examined children exhibiting other symptoms during these visits, but the focus 
was squarely on evidence. The visitors questioned ‘the family members of the deceased and 
members of the community, in addition to undertaking very close inspections of available 
foods, utensils, vessels for the storage of water and food, the areas around houses, food 
residues as well as those of their respective containers’.4 One epidemiologist said that she 
climbed thatched roofs searching for containers of mercury left over from small-scale 
mining operations. Epidemiologists took nasal swabs and samples of blood, water from the 
river, and food. The Cuban commission generated particularly detailed evidence, ‘looking for 
data of Hygienic-Epidemiological interest’ (Coordinacion de Epidemiologia 2007, 1). For 
each death, they provided the name, age, gender, date on onset of symptoms, date of death, 
and brief observations. Commission members gave ‘educational talks’.  
Despite efforts to find evidence of mercury poisoning, water samples and blood tests were 
negative. Another hypothesis centered on lead poisoning; one report indicated vaguely that 
lead levels were ‘above normal’. No sources of lead poisoning were found, and no one was 
treated for this condition. The Cuban epidemiologist rather suspected ‘a highly virulent kind 
of modified adenovirus, or an enterovirus of the Coxsackie type, or another type of germ 
that uses this route of tranmission’ (Coordinación de Epidemiología 2007, 4). To date, no 
official diagnosis has been presented.  
 
We wisidatu think that this disease is too dangerous. . . .  
When there is hebu sickness, we extract it, and patients recover.  
But when we treat these patients, nothing happens. 
– Inocencio Torres 
 
The lower delta includes healers representing a diversity of specialties; some children were 
treated by as many as a dozen. Like Cáceres, healers expressed frustration, sadness, and a 
sense of failure when they could neither diagnose nor treat patients. Like bilingual nurses but 
unlike physicians and epidemiologists, healers knew a great deal about the strange cases 
 
3  On Mission Barrio Adentro, see Muntaner et al. 2006; Briggs and Mantini-Briggs 2009. 
4  This information comes from a report (informe) dated 6 February 2008 by the regional epidemiologist. 







before patients arrived by listening to ‘radio warao’, informal transmission of news around the 
lower delta. Their observations of patients was supplemented by what they learned from 
family members and other healers. Some persisted in trying to make sense of the epidemic. 
Several traced the epidemic to social conflict, citing disagreements between neighbors as 
prompting ‘bad medicine’. Others drew attention to the role of government contractors 
from outside the delta who had been hired to build bridges or houses: friction with residents 
over projects left incomplete and unpaid wages owed to local workers reportedly resulted in 
unfamiliar types of ‘bad medicine’ that delta healers could not treat.  
Becoming a healer involves mastery of an extensive mythic corpus, and many healers 
connected myths, symptoms, and contemporary events in compiling evidence. One 
symptom, hydrophobia (fear of water), led healer Paulino Zapata to link the epidemic to the 
parallel underwater world, citing myths in which water spirits introduced illness and death 
among humans and pan-Amazonic traditions of water spirits. Team member and healer 
Tirso Gómez questioned the relegation of vampire bats to a disease vector in the team’s own 
epidemiological formulation by performing the myth of the bat, pointing to a much longer 
and more intimate history of multispecies relations. 
Venezuelan public health physician Dr. Clara Mantini-Briggs and I stumbled onto the 
epidemic in July 2008 while working with residents to establish a new model for health care. 
Health Committee President Conrado Moraleda had been pressing health officials since 
August 2007 to take more concerted steps. Frustrated by RHS’s efforts to render the third 
wave of cases invisible, he joined his brother Enrique in launching an investigation, 
recruiting us to participate as physician and anthropologist. Creating a complex knowledge-
production process that drew on political oratory, indigenous medicine, dispute mediation, 
parents’ narratives, epidemiology, and clinical medicine, we documented thirty-eight deaths 
in fourteen settlements. The symptoms reported were fever, headache, body aches, a feeling 
of itching in the feet that turned to numbness and then paralysis that ascended, difficulty 
swallowing, hydrophobia, seizures, strange dreams or hallucinations, and excessive salivation, 
resulting in death. A strong indication of rabies was supported by examining a patient, Elbia 
Torres Rivas, for several days until the time of her death, even as we provided palliative care. 
Our own search for evidence led us to find that most patients had been bitten nocturnally by 
vampire bats approximately one and one-half months before the onset of symptoms.5  
 
5  We document the epidemic and the team’s work in Briggs and Mantini-Briggs 2016. 







Ecologies of evidence 
Evidence: Lots was produced. Everyone wanted it. Everyone wanted it to turn magically into 
a diagnosis and an end to the epidemic. The same dying and dead bodies became recognized 
sites for producing evidence for physicians, epidemiologists, healers, and parents. Evidence 
circulated like crazy throughout the delta and among health professionals in the capital 
during each wave. And yet this evidence proved to be lethally inefficacious: it did not add up 
to a diagnosis prior to August 2008. After officials angrily dismissed bat-transmitted rabies, 
the evidence they collected provided fodder for rendering the epidemic officially invisible 
again. One way to think about this situation would be to examine the cultural conventions 
(Trostle 2005) and the modes of classification (Bowker and Star 1999) that epidemiologists 
used in turning bodies into numbers, into diagnostic categories and statistical tables imbued 
with authority and mobility (Latour 1999). We could also follow how clinical medicine and 
epidemiology turned parents’ and healers’ evidence into nonknowledge (Geissler 2013). 
Another key dimension would be how particular evidential features – particularly 
hydrophobia – became boundary objects that fit into different frameworks. Such a course of 
action would, however, reproduce epidemiology’s claims to autonomy, decontextualizing it 
from the broader ecologies of evidence that constituted the epidemic. Exploring these 
ecologies ethnographically, I would like to suggest four ways that evidence production 
thwarted diagnosis rather than fostering efficacious health policies and practices. 
First, Latour’s notion of immutable mobiles (1988) and his characterization of circulating 
reference (1999) would seem to suggest that the production of scientific evidence is oriented 
towards enhancing its mobility. Yet the practices emerging in the epidemic produced very 
limited and specific forms of mobility and a great deal of immobility. Cáceres’s one-page 
summaries were meant to be read only by hospital physicians who provided higher levels of 
care to the same patient. He hoped that they would spark an evidentiary exchange, counter-
referrals that would inform his efforts to diagnose and treat future patients. Despite requests 
made by two-way radio, during trips to RHS’s headquarters, and in letters to his superiors 
summarizing evidence about the epidemic and soliciting clinical and laboratory results, no 
evidence was forthcoming. The director reportedly told him that further efforts to initiate 
evidentiary exchanges might cost him his career. Epidemiologists incorporated brief 
summaries of Cáceres’s clinical evidence into their reports, but these were documents 
destined for very limited routes of circulation and specified endpoints: the inboxes and file 
cabinets of RHS’s director and regional epidemiologist. The final report on the epidemic was 
sealed in the offices of RHS’s director and the national epidemiologist; no one can view it. 
Ecologies of evidence are thus structured as much around the production of what I would 
call ‘mutable immobiles’ as immutable mobiles. The team’s desire to enable its own account 
to become sufficiently mobile so as to reach national officials, thereby circumventing efforts 







by regional health authorities to hide the epidemic, similarly required us to make some 
accounts, such as those regarding ‘bad medicine’, immobile.   
Second, barriers to the collaborative production and circulation of evidence proliferated. 
Regarding one of the children, Cáceres wrote: ‘the treating physician decided to refer her [to 
a hospital in the state capital], but the parents refused and proceeded to discharge the patient 
against medical advice’, instead taking her ‘to the wasiratu [sic]’, referring to a type of healer. 
When our team presented its findings to the national epidemiologist – after a standoff 
witnessed by national and international journalists – Delta Amacuro’s government 
criminalized our efforts to produce evidence. Healers also erected their own barriers: their 
evidence was couched in specialized terms not shared by nonhealers, circulating mainly 
among themselves.  
Third, evidence production was not limited to sites of caregiving. After repeated appeals to 
RHS officials failed to spark a more robust response, Conrado Moraleda presented evidence 
of the strange deaths to state legislators, leading to a confrontation with RHS covered by the 
local newspaper. Countering this purported attack on their monopoly on the production of 
health evidence, RHS officials circulated statements through rumors, radio broadcasts, and 
press conferences that projected the consumption of poisoned fruit or fish or garbage or 
mistreatment by local healers as possible causes. The assistant regional epidemiologist then 
launched a massive seven-day investigation that produced masses of statistical evidence; the 
final report mentioned only ‘diarrheas and vomiting’, not symptoms identified by Cáceres 
and epidemiologists (Lopez 2008, 1). The investigation ended with a visit by journalists and 
the vice-minister from the Ministry for Popular Power in Health. How epidemiology is 
imbricated in this broader ecology of evidence becomes apparent here. Moraleda’s evidence, 
produced in collaboration with the local physician, sparked denigrating rumors and 
epidemiological research. Rather than the circulation of biomedical evidence through ‘the 
media’, these events formed part of a broader process of what we have called 
‘biomediatization’, the coproduction of health knowledge by media and health professionals 
and laypersons in a variety of sites (Briggs and Mantini-Briggs 2016). Like laboratory and 
clinical evidence of pharmaceuticals (see Dumit 2012), this evidence was biomedical and 
mediatized from the start.    
Finally, the parents’ role in this ecology of evidence helps indicate why it failed to produce an 
official diagnosis. Parents wanted to know what was killing their children, and they 
desperately sought to prevent further deaths. They had observed symptoms, tried forms of 
care, and asked healers, nurses, and physicians to extend care and share evidence. The 
parents’ observations were as crucial to these ecologies of evidence as their children’s bodies. 
All practitioners extracted fragments of the parents’ observations, but their questions and 
interpretations followed from etiological frames and discursive practices that limited the 







parents’ input to responses to their queries. None expressed interest in the parents’ practices 
for producing evidence or their narratives.  
The encounters between epidemiologists and Mukoboina residents are striking. Framing 
these visits as exchanges, the parents assembled, anxious to share their narratives and 
evidence. Epidemiologists, however, had no interest in attending community meetings or 
hearing parents’ narratives, only in getting answers to questions and making observations. 
Parents rejected passive and subordinate roles in evidence production. Epidemiologists 
misconstrued residents’ frustration as evidence of ‘the community’s closed nature’, as refusal 
to share evidence. The situation worsened when parents asked epidemiologists to share their 
evidence and hypotheses; they left without responding and never sent any information. Their 
evidence was produced for health officials, not clinicians or residents. 
Conclusion 
These ecologies of evidence thus positioned the parents vis-à-vis multiple inequities. Care 
and the production and communication of evidence were deeply imbricated: parents 
mobilized archives of evidence along with the bodies of their dying children. Caregivers, 
including healers, exploited the details parents provided but denigrated their status as 
producers of evidence. Parents’ efforts to pursue all possible sites of evidence production 
and care were disparaged, particularly when they crossed ontological borders. As they moved 
progressively through higher levels of care – from nurses to Cáceres to the hospital in the 
state capital to metropolitan intensive care units – parents’ efforts to pass along evidence 
they had amassed were increasingly sidelined until they were rendered mute in urban 
hospitals. Exacerbating deplorable ‘normal’ health conditions, the epidemic exemplified the 
sorts of health inequities targeted by global health programs. By examining how they were 
enmeshed in ecologies of evidence, I have explored the way health inequities are coproduced 
with what I refer to as ‘health/communicative inequities’: health inequities and 
health/communicative inequities came together at each site in which care was sought, in 
epidemiological investigations, and in denigrating stories in newspapers and on radio 
stations.   
The epidemic also richly illustrated possibilities for transforming health/communicative 
inequities. Health and health/communicative inequities were massively coproduced in the 
area in 1992–1993 during a cholera epidemic that killed some five hundred people.6 Their 
fusion produced a stereotype of ‘the Warao indigenous ethnic group’ as a homogeneous 
 
6  See Briggs and Mantini-Briggs 2003. 







population incapable of grasping basic hygienic principles or understanding what doctors tell 
them. A decade and a half later, Conrado and Enrique Moraleda challenged these stereotypes 
by creating a team to investigate a new epidemic and producing evidence for presentation to 
national health officials. Angered by collaborations between health officials and regional 
journalists in February 2008 that resulted in the same sort of denigrating press coverage that 
characterized the cholera epidemic, the four ‘Warao’ members of the team made articulate 
statements to national and international journalists, which were then circulated in some thirty 
thousand stories worldwide. Their desire to highlight their own process of producing 
evidence and the vision of critical global health that lay behind it prompted a book, Una 
efermedad monstruo: Indígenas derribando el cerco de la discriminación en salud7 based on and structured 
around conversations between team members. The remarkable insights that emerged from 
efforts by Conrado Moraleda, Enrique Moraleda, Norbelys Gómez, and Tirso Gómez 
suggest that perspectives in global health will fail to become fully critical unless they attend 
to health/communicative inequities and how they structure ecologies of evidence.8  
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